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*Hume Studies* Volume 32, Number 2, (2006) 153-276.

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# The Role of Justice in Hume's Theory of Psychological Development

LORRAINE BESSER-JONES

*Abstract:* Hume's theory of justice, intricately linked to his account of moral development, is at once simplistic and mysterious, combining familiar conventionalist elements with perplexing, complicated elements of his rich moral psychology. These dimensions of his theory make interpreting it no easy task, although many have tried. Emerging from these many different attempts is a picture of Hume as defending an account of justice according to which justice consists of expedient rules designed to advance one's self-interest. The mistake of this view, I argue, lies in its narrow focus on the material rather than psychological effects of the conventions of justice. My goal here is to isolate the psychological effects of the rules of justice by analyzing the psychological transformation of the parties who morally commit to justice.

## Introduction

Hume's theory of justice, intricately linked to his account of moral development, is at once simplistic and mysterious; combining familiar conventionalist elements with perplexing, complicated elements of his rich moral psychology. These dimensions of his theory make interpreting it no easy task, although many have tried. Emerging from these many different attempts is a picture of Hume as defending an account of justice according to which justice consists of expedient rules designed to advance one's self-interest. The mistake of this picture, I argue,

lies in its narrow focus on the material rather than psychological effects of the conventions of justice. A wider look into the effects of justice reveals an important psychological dimension. An appreciation of the psychological effects of justice reveals a predominantly overlooked role of justice that makes Hume's theory both rich and distinctive. My goal here is to isolate the psychological effects of the rules of justice by analyzing the psychological transformation of the parties who morally commit to justice. We will see that justice re-directs our social passions and in particular our passion for pride. This redirection enables parties to fully develop their social natures and flourish as they should: in society, amongst their fellows, in a state of "perfect harmony and concord" (T 3.2.2, SBN 491).<sup>1</sup>

Insofar as my interpretation draws heavily on Hume's theory of pride, his discussion of which is limited to the *Treatise*, my project is best understood as an interpretation of his account of justice in the *Treatise* and not necessarily in the *Enquiry*, although, as I note later, several passages in the *Enquiry*<sup>2</sup> provide implicit support for my argument. Moreover, insofar as my focus in this paper remains primarily on only one aspect of Hume's theory of justice, it will help to distinguish from the outset two different aspects of Hume's theory of justice that play a particularly prominent role in the *Treatise*: his understanding of the  *motive*  to justice and his understanding of the  *role*  of justice.

While certainly these two aspects overlap and influence one another in a variety of ways, it is important to realize that they are, in fact, distinct issues: the former concerns the connections between the rules of justice and an agent's desire states, while the latter concerns the effects the rules of justice have on an agent. The secondary literature pays considerable attention to the question of the motive to justice; questions of the role of justice, however, are taken to be either obvious and so not interesting, or simply derivative of Hume's understanding of the motive to justice. In this paper I argue that Hume's understanding of the role of justice is important and interesting independently of his discussion of the motive to justice. And, while in defending my interpretation of the role of justice, I at times draw on Hume's discussion of the motive to justice, insofar as my focus is on the role of justice my discussion will not center on the issues of motivation raised by Hume's circle argument—an argument which seeks to identify the original, morally approved motive that makes justice an artificial virtue.<sup>3</sup> While I hope that my discussion of the role of justice will have some impact on that debate, exploring these connections is not my project here. Instead, my focus remains on identifying the important role Hume assigns for justice in our psychological development.

My paper proceeds as follows. I first explore the limitations of the standard interpretation of Hume's understanding of the role of justice, and, in particular, the limited ability of this interpretation to explain Hume's understanding of the moral commitment to the rules of justice. To explain adequately this aspect

of Hume's theory, I argue, we need to explore the psychological transformation Hume believes people undergo upon embracing the rules of justice. I tackle this exploration in the second section of the paper, where I begin by considering previous discussions of this psychological transformation, and in particular, the interpretations offered by Sayre-McCord, Taylor, and Darwall. I argue that none of these accounts appreciate the full psychological effect of the rules of justice; this effect is the redirection of pride, illustrated through the development of a concern for one's character. The redirection of pride made possible by the rules of justice is, I argue, an essential aspect of people's psychological development. In the third section of the paper, I illustrate in depth how, on Hume's account, this redirection of pride is dependent on justice.

Throughout the paper I use the term "justice" to refer, as Hume does, primarily to the artificial virtue associated with following the rules governing property. Given the structural parallels between justice and the remaining artificial virtues, I expect much of what I have to say about justice will be applicable to the other artificial virtues as well, although I do not explore these applications here.

## **1. The Standard Interpretation of Hume's Theory of the Role of Justice**

The most popular interpretation of Hume's theory of justice runs something like this: Hume imagines that a pre-justice society—were one to exist—would be a state of inconvenience. We would be able to acquire basic necessities without resorting to a war of all upon all, but nonetheless we would still want more: nature cruelly has given us "numberless wants and necessities," yet "slender means" to attain what we want and need (T 3.2.2.2; SBN 484). We would have social connections to our families and narrow circles of friends, but we would be partial to them, and our benevolence would be limited to them alone. These two factors would combine to generate a desire to acquire "goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends," a desire which "is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society" (T 3.2.2.12; SBN 491).

To escape this state of inconvenience, Hume hypothesizes that parties would agree to abide by conventions of justice on the condition that others do as well. Through their experience of familial life, people would quickly learn that cooperation provides a remedy for these inconveniences, and begin to see the benefits of social living, made possible through setting up rules of interaction. They would realize the advantages of establishing rules that secure property and thus enable them to take security in their possessions and escape much of the conflict that arises within a state of nature. This joint realization occurs gradually, as people would come to realize the effectiveness of unspoken agreements to refrain from another's property. A "general sense of common interest" arises, as people observe the individual benefit of "regulat[ing] their conduct by certain rules" (T 3.2.2.10;

SBN 490). This is how society, regulated through the conventions of justice that fix property, presumably originates: through the inventions of the rules of justice, inventions that are motivated by a desire to advance interest. These rules “bestow a stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry” (T 3.2.2.9; SBN 489).

Hume argues that self-interest motivates people to establish society, writing clearly: “thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice” (T 3.2.2.24; SBN 499), after describing the transition into society:

After men have found by experience, that their selfishness and confined generosity, acting at their liberty, totally incapacitate them for society; and at the same time have observed, that society is necessary to the satisfaction of those under the restraint of such rules, as may render their commerce more safe and commodious. To the imposition then, and observance of these rules, both in general, and in a very particular instance, they are at first moved only by a regard to interest. (T 3.2.2.24; SBN 498–9)

Since self-interest is what would lead people to form the conventions of justice, many have concluded that this motive is what essentially characterizes the Humean understanding of the *role* of justice: justice is expedient. And while many interpreters go to great lengths to try to identify the subtle features that distinguish Hume’s account from a Hobbesian one,<sup>4</sup> at a very fundamental level, this standard interpretation of Hume makes him out to endorse a Hobbesian view of the role of justice: the role of justice is to promote an agent’s self-interest. The conventions of justice enable agents to escape the inconveniences of pre-justice society and thereby to advance their interest. Beyond this (albeit important) expedient role, there is nothing really special about justice.

We see this tendency to identify Hume’s account of justice with a Hobbesian one clearly in the following authors. Terence Penelhum argues that, on Hume’s account, “[s]ocial conventions, then arise because of our self-interest and our awareness of the fact that this interest dictates conventions that habituate us to actions that confined benevolence cannot guarantee.”<sup>5</sup> Geoffrey Sayre-McCord agrees: “the rules of justice, on Hume’s account are meant to answer our (relatively confined) self-interest.”<sup>6</sup>

There is no doubt that Hume believes justice plays a significant role in easing the inconveniences of pre-justice society, and in advancing an agent’s self-interest in general. However, Hume’s discussion of justice is littered with hints that expediency is not the only—nor even the most important—role of justice. In his discussion of the motive of justice, he expresses doubt that private interest can motivate agents to consistently adhere to the rules of justice, suggesting that it will

(often) be the case that justice is not expedient, yet plays an important role nonetheless. This point is underscored by his *Enquiry* discussion of the sensible knave in which he grants that the knave judges correctly that justice may sometimes not be in his interest, yet claims that in thinking that he should therefore violate the rules of justice, the knave misses out on the true point of justice.<sup>7</sup>

A significant trend amongst Hume's interpreters is to dismiss these comments and others like them as exhibiting some of Hume's less comprehensible moments. Thus, for example, interpreters have written off Hume's discussion of the motive to justice (the circle argument) as containing a "comedy of errors"<sup>8</sup> and have suggested that Hume never took seriously the challenge of the sensible knave.<sup>9</sup> Those interpreters that do take Hume's remarks in these areas seriously have focused on their implications for his understanding of the *motive* of justice considered largely in isolation from the role Hume attributes to justice. It is with respect to the *role* of justice, however, that such remarks raise the most pressing and perplexing questions: if the role of justice does not lie exclusively in its expediency, where else does it lie?

In order to answer this question, we need to broaden our focus and look beyond the material effects of the rules of justice. As this discussion has shown, the material effects, while important, cannot explain all that Hume intends for his theory of justice. In particular, an emphasis on the material effects of the rules of justice seems inadequate to explain what I will call the "moral commitment" to the rules of justice. The moral commitment to the rules of justice arises once the rules are already established, and involves attributing "to the observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity" (T 3.2.2.1; SBN 484). In making the moral commitment, our obligation to justice moves from being merely "natural," reflective of interest, to being "moral," and reflective of sentiments of right and wrong (T 3.2.2.23; SBN 498). This moral commitment is of particular concern. Not only does Hume devote considerable attention to explaining it and identifying it as something distinct from the natural obligation; it is also the case that the moral commitment to justice, unlike the natural obligation to justice, plausibly reflects a non-fictional aspect of the conventions of justice. While we all are born to societies already governed by rules of justice, we are not born *morally committed* to them. Developing this state of moral commitment is a challenge that—unlike the challenge of establishing the rules of justice—most of us will face; exactly why it is important that we rise to this challenge is a question worthy of exploration. We need to begin this exploration by looking into Hume's understanding of the psychological effects that attend parties who morally commit to the rules, effects that, while less tangible than the material ones, are no less important. Upon so doing, we uncover in Hume's theory an irreplaceable role for justice as that which provides an agent's pride with the direction requisite for its development.

## 2. Psychological Transformations<sup>10</sup>

### 2.1 *The General Point of View*

Perhaps the most clear and, certainly, the most widely recognized, psychological effect made possible by the conventions of justice is the development of the general point of view. Absent the conventions of justice, in what Hume refers to as our “wild, uncultivated state” (T 3.2.2.4; SBN 486), parties are partial to their narrow circles of family and friends. They have sympathy, but their sympathetic responses engage only with their narrow circle, and do not extend beyond it. In this sense, sympathy operates from a limited point of view. Hume stresses, however, that people need to engage with those beyond this narrow circle;<sup>11</sup> in order to do so, they need to “[rub] off those rough corners and untoward affections” (T 3.2.2.4; SBN 486) they have toward those outside their narrow circle and seek a harmonious existence with all. As Sayre-McCord argues, recognition of this need to live in harmony with others prompts parties to regulate their sympathetic responses by reflection upon a general point of view, for it is only then that parties succeed in “establishing a suitably stable standard which is *accessible to all*.”<sup>12</sup> This suggests that people have a pressing need to interact socially; a need that resolves itself by regulating the nature of sympathy. The result is a new stage of psychological development, one that lays the groundwork for an agent’s moral development.

Jacqueline Taylor takes this point one step further and argues that this transition from a limited, partial point of view to a general point of view whereby we are able to “form shareable moral points of view from which we can reach agreement on the value of characters” is tied to the distinctive role of the rules of justice and, in fact, is a precondition of the development of the natural virtues.<sup>13</sup> Taylor suggests that it is only because justice requires a redirection of interest that our sympathetic responses shift from the limited to the general point of view: “the shift in interest influences the direction of our sympathy.”<sup>14</sup> While this shift occurs as an “unintended result” of agreement to the rules of justice,<sup>15</sup> the psychological transformation is crucial in that it is what enables us to develop the “specifically moral sentiments” that lie at the core of the natural virtues.<sup>16</sup> Her interpretation thus makes sense of Hume’s claim that “the sense of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice” (T 3.2.2.24; SBN 499).

While Taylor, in particular, appreciates the distinctive role the conventions of justice play in this psychological transformation, appealing to this shift from the partial to the general point of view cannot explain fully the role Hume sees for justice as it cannot account for all that Hume takes justice to include—particularly since he denies that just acts are always in the public’s interest.<sup>17</sup> There is thus, even on this more nuanced understanding of the shift to the general point of view,

an important gap to be addressed. We know that, according to Hume, we must always and inflexibly follow the rules of justice *and* that we morally approve of those who do, yet we do not know why: what are the effects of making the moral commitment to treat the rules of justice as inviolable? We have good reason to think that parties who make this moral commitment to the rules of justice, and agree to adhere to them always and inflexibly, undergo a more significant psychological transformation than appreciating the general point of view alone. What else happens when agents recognize the importance of the rules of justice and commit to them?

## **2.2 The Just Disposition**

Stephen Darwall offers one answer to this question in his analysis of the “just disposition” Humean parties develop upon committing to the rules of justice. He argues that, on Hume’s account, what is distinctive about the psychology of the just person is the development of a system of internal motivation and that the development of this system is required by Hume’s understanding of the moral commitment to the rules of justice. While, as Darwall himself notes, this interpretation leaves Hume with a deeply conflicted view of agency, it is nonetheless worth exploring. In particular, Darwall’s interpretation provides helpful insights into the nature of justice and the phenomenology of the just person; insights that bring us closer to a full appreciation of the psychological effects of the rules of justice.

Darwall draws his characterization of the just disposition primarily from Hume’s account of the development of the conventions of justice, which he describes as essentially involving the adoption of a just disposition. His idea is that, when people commit to the rules of justice, what they are really agreeing to is to take on a particular disposition, and so to alter their psychology in a fundamental way. Rather than acting directly on the basis of their passions, people agree to act on *rules* instead. This represents a remarkable shift in people’s psychology. No longer are people motivated hedonistically; instead they are motivated by their internalization of rules.

This interpretation of the just disposition, Darwall argues, follows from Hume’s view of the role of justice. Recall that, while Hume denies that justice invariably promotes self-interest—enlightened or otherwise—he nonetheless believes people commit to following the rules of justice inflexibly, regardless of the particular ends to be obtained by so doing. This leads Darwall to conclude that Hume must have in mind a picture of the just agent who sees herself as *internally* obligated by the rules, for there is no further source of external obligation.

Hume’s continued talk of acceptance of (“embrac[ing]”: ECPM. 192) and regulation by rules must now be taken seriously. And this requires



interpreting Hume as holding that just persons regard the rules *internally* as agents. They take them to have a normative relevance to their conduct distinct from a consideration of any good or evil that “may be attain’d by any action of the mind or body.” (THN. 439)<sup>18</sup>

According to Darwall, the just disposition must be, quite simply, a rule-following disposition, characterized by the motive of rule-regulation. This disposition is the only one that ensures faithful adherence to the rules of justice that, in time, we come to morally approve. Thus, Darwall argues that the “virtue of justice [consists] in the agent’s regulating herself by the relevant rules (or her disposition to do so).”<sup>19</sup> The psychological transformation incurred by parties committing to justice is simply the realization of a new, internal source of motivation—what Darwall would describe as a recognition of an “internal ought.”

Darwall’s understanding of the just disposition helps explain many of the complexities of Hume’s theory of justice.<sup>20</sup> Understanding the role of justice as enabling agents to attain a new level of psychological development (internal motivation) that is obtainable only through a commitment to regulating oneself by the rules of justice both explains why it is that the rules of justice are inflexible and makes considerable progress towards making sense of Hume’s reply to the knave. The main problem with his account, and one that Darwall himself points out, is that understanding the just disposition as involving internal motivation by rules is incompatible with Hume’s psychology of action.

Hume argues that the will always aims at good or evil, understood hedonistically in terms of pain and pleasure: “The will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain’d by any action of the mind or body” (T 2.3.9.7; SBN 439). It follows from this that motives are always directed towards a particular state of affairs. People’s motives are in this sense instrumental: we are motivated to seek good and avoid evil.

When it comes to the rules of justice, however, Darwall suggests that Hume tries—unsuccessfully—to depart from this psychology of action by depicting the just person as one who treats the rules of justice as motivating norms without a regard for the consequences of so doing:

What is distinctive about just persons, Hume tells us, is not their seeking some good or avoiding some evil “by any action of the mind or body” but their *regulating* themselves by *rules* (of property, transfer, and promise) they regard as “sacred and inviolable” (THN. 533). This affects in fascinating ways Hume’s account of the obligation to be just.<sup>21</sup>

While Darwall does think Hume’s understanding of the just disposition is novel and promising in its own right, he nonetheless thinks that Hume cannot escape

the conflict between his understanding of the motive of rule-regulation and his theory of the will. Hume's theory of justice demands that parties undergo a psychological transformation his theory of the will claims to be impossible.

To help us understand Darwall's conclusion regarding this apparent conflict, it is useful to look further into Darwall's understanding of what is involved in developing the just disposition, and how this conflicts with Hume's hedonistic psychology of the will. The just disposition involves the process of accepting norms and regulating oneself by them. The defining aspect of this process is the development of a distinct sort of motivation: agents who develop a just disposition are motivated by the rules of justice without direct consideration of the state of affairs to be obtained by acting on these rules. This sort of motivation, Darwall argues, is requisite to the state of rule-regulation. Where agents act only to produce a certain state of affairs, they have not developed the *just* disposition. That Hume thinks the just disposition requires such motivation seems to follow from his discussion of the inflexibility of the rules of justice, over the course of which he argues that the rules of justice must be followed independently of consideration of the particular effects of so doing. We must repay greedy misers and keep secret promises; on Darwall's interpretation, this is so not because such acts produce a certain state of affairs, but *only* because such acts are called for by the rules of justice. A just person thus must act for the sake of rules: she must be motivated internally by her acceptance of them. However, this sort of motivation is something Hume's theory of the will holds to be impossible. Hume's official psychology of action is a hedonistic one, which holds that people act only to attain pleasure and avoid pain. Even a liberal interpretation of this view that relaxes Hume's hedonistic commitments cannot escape the desire-based psychology invoked here. Humean agents act to attain some state of affairs and are motivated by their desires to do so. This is why Darwall thinks that the Humean psychology cannot sustain the view that the motive to justice is a motive of rule-regulation. Hume's portrayal of the just disposition depicts a psychological transformation his theory of the will precludes.

While Darwall's exploration into the full extent of the psychological transformation seems to have reached a dead end, it nonetheless suggests a need to keep looking. After all, while Darwall is correct to note that this interpretation conflicts with Hume's "official" psychology of the will, Darwall is also correct in suggesting that this interpretation best reflects what Hume thinks happens when people morally commit to justice, and so indirectly helps us to gain insight into what role Hume assigns to the rules of justice. When people make the moral commitment to treating the rules of justice as inviolable, they commit to a certain mode of acting: rather than acting only upon consultation with their (public or private, shared or general) interests, they are regulating their behavior in a distinct fashion. When parties commit to the rules of justice, more

happens to them on a psychological level than shifting to a general point of view. Darwall's analysis shows us that while this "something more" appears to be adopting a state of internally motivated rule-regulation, such a psychological transformation would require too dramatic an overhaul to Hume's theory of the will. The question we are left with, then, is the following: is there an interpretation of the psychological transformation that preserves the insights Darwall brings to the discussion without calling for a departure from Hume's theory of the will?

It seems to me that there is. Darwall shortchanges his own argument by failing to consider the possibility that the just disposition involves both a state of rule-regulation *and* a desire-based motivation for the goods attained by this *state* (as opposed to the goods attained by individual acts). He assumes that in order for people to *regulate* themselves by rules, they must regard them as *internally* motivated, "distinct from a consideration of any good or evil."<sup>22</sup> Is it not possible, however, that people can commit to the rules of justice and agree to regulate their conduct by them, while considering as well the good or evil that comes from so doing? Darwall seems to assume that once talk of interest is excluded from consideration, so too is all talk of "good and evil." But this assumption is not warranted, particularly since, as Darwall notes, it stands in conflict with Hume's official psychology of the will. It is possible that Hume believes both that the just disposition consists of being regulated, in the particular instance, by rules rather than states of affairs, and that, upon developing a just disposition, parties find that they fulfill some more basic desire—a desire than can only be fulfilled through internally regulating themselves by the rules of justice. The role of justice, on this reading, is not to aid parties in developing some sort of internal ought—although something like this is an important step along the way; it is to aid them in fulfilling this more basic desire. The just person commits herself to the rules of justice, and while on a case by case basis her actions might be best described as following from her commitment to rules of justice, the will underlying this *pattern* of actions aims at a concrete end-state of desire satisfaction and as such is consistent with Hume's theory of the will.

This reading, I think, most accurately captures the structure of the psychological transformation that Hume believes the just person undergoes. The pressing task now is to give content to this structure, that is, to identify in detail how it is that agents are psychologically transformed through committing to justice, exactly what passions are influenced by this transformation, and how these passions are linked to justice. Doing so will provide us with an understanding of the role of justice that has proved so elusive: the role of justice, we will see, is to provide parties with the proper direction to the motives and propensities that enable them to attain their human potential as social beings.

### **2.3 A Concern for One's Character**

The above discussion shows two psychological stages undergone by parties who morally commit to the rules of justice. First, they shift from a state governed by private interests and a limited point of view to a state governed by shared interests and a general point of view. Second, they move from acting on a case-by-case basis for the sake of satisfying desires to regulating their actions by rules. As we have seen, these two stages offer an incomplete understanding of the psychological transformation; however, I will now argue that a recognition of a third stage completes this understanding and provides us with a clear appreciation of the role of justice. This third stage is the development of a concern for reputation, a stage which tracks the redirection of an agent's pride and illustrates the important role justice plays in enabling people to fulfill their social natures.

The development of what Hume calls a "concern for reputation" emerges when agents begin to appreciate the importance of social relationships. As we have seen, Hume believes that parties are first led to develop rules of justice upon recognizing and developing a common sense of interest. People recognize they are all in the same boat, as it were, and so might as well work together to avoid the inconveniences of their pre-justice society. He writes:

There needs but a very little practice of the world, to make us perceive all these consequences and advantages. The shortest experience of society discovers them to every mortal; and when each individual perceives the same sense of interest in his fellows, he immediately performs his part of any contract as being assur'd that they will not be wanting in theirs. All of them, by concert, enter into a scheme of actions, calculated for common benefit, and agree to be true to their word; nor is there any thing requisite to form this concert or convention, but that every one have a sense of interest in the faithful fulfilling of engagements, and express that sense to other members of society. (T 3.2.5.11; SBN 522)

Through stabilizing property, the conventions of justice allow and encourage the development of social relationships; relationships which, Hume emphasizes, are essential to the development of many, if not all, of an agent's passions.<sup>23</sup> Interest first stimulates such relationships. However, once parties engage in meaningful social relations governed by the rules of justice, they find the benefit of such relationships extends beyond the fulfillment of "interest." Such relationships do not just satisfy their immediate interests in overcoming the inconveniences of pre-justice society, they also provide parties with the outlet to develop their passions to their fullest extent: "instead of departing from our interest, or from that of our nearest friends, by abstaining from the possessions of others, we cannot better consult

both these interests, than by such a convention; because it is by that means we maintain society, which is so necessary to their well-being and subsistence, as well as to our own" (T 3.2.2.0; SBN 489). The rules of justice give new direction to people's propensities and motives and they find themselves in a better position, both materially *and* psychologically. Awareness of this position triggers the development of "a sentiment of morals" that "concur[s] with interest, and becomes a new obligation upon mankind" (T 3.2.5.12; SBN 523).<sup>24</sup>

The emergence of this sentiment of morals signals a new appreciation parties have for the rules of justice, and the level of social engagement such rules enable. Hume believes that, for most of us, this development is an on-going and gradual one that begins at a young age, in the context of the family, and is then supplemented by politicians. This process of moral education, he suggests, culminates in the moral affirmation of the rules of justice. This affirmation tracks the development of a new outlook on oneself and one's relation to others. Once people find it *morally* important that they regulate their behavior by the rules of justice, Hume stresses in the *Enquiry*, they begin to value themselves in terms of their success in so doing: their "inward peace of mind" depends upon "a satisfactory review of [their] own conduct (EPM 9.23; SBN 282). The person who has undergone the complete psychological transformation distinctive of the just person values her interactions with others so much that she begins to value herself in terms of how she interacts with others. She attains "inward peace of mind" through regulating herself by the rules of justice; her well-being is thus intricately linked to her interactions with others (EPM 9.23; SBN 282).

These comments in the *Enquiry* reverberate Hume's prior emphasis in the *Treatise* on the development of a "concern for reputation," an honorable one which can be obtained only through adopting an exceptionless rule-following disposition:

There is nothing, which touches us more dearly than our reputation, and nothing on which our reputation more depends than our conduct, with relation to the property of others. For this reason, every one, who has any regard to his character, or who intends to live on good terms with mankind, must fix an inviolable law to himself, never, by any temptation, to be induced to violate those principles, which are essential to a man of probity and honor. (T 3.2.2.27; SBN 501)

Being aware of one's reputation, it seems, is a way of gauging one's success in regulating their conduct and living on "good terms with mankind"—developing a concern for one's reputation is, Hume writes, "the surest guardian of every virtue" (EPM 9.1; SBN 276).

While Hume believes that all people—just or not—desire the “love and approbation of mankind” (T 2.2.1.14; SBN 332), it is only when this desire becomes associated with virtue, that it finds its proper direction as a virtuous motive: “a desire of fame, reputation, or a character with others, is so far from being blamable, that it seems inseparable from virtue, genius, capacity, and a generous or noble disposition” (EPM 8.11; SBN 265). The development of this concern for one’s character has a self-regulatory effect:

By our continual and earnest pursuit of a character, a name, a reputation in the world, we bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review, and consider how they appear in the eyes of those who approach and regard us. This constant habit of surveying ourselves, as it were, in reflection, keeps alive all the sentiments of right and wrong, and begets in noble natures, a certain reverence for themselves as well as others. (EPM 9.1; SBN 276)

My suggestion is that the development of this “continual and earnest” concern for character functions as the desire which underlies the commitment to rules and development of a just disposition characterized by rule-regulation and thus provides us with an understanding of rule-regulation that is compatible with Hume’s psychology of the will.

That a concern for one’s character plays this essential role in the development of the just disposition is underscored by Hume’s *Enquiry* discussion of the sensible knave. The sensible knave is one who “commits” to justice yet fails to develop the just disposition. In our terms, the knave is one who has failed to undergo the psychological transformation distinctive of the just person. He enters into the conventions of justice, but does not develop the sentiment of morals, and so has not made a moral commitment to the rules of justice. The knave does not internally regulate himself by the rules of justice; instead he acts only from interest on a case-by-case basis.

In his discussion of the knave, Hume stresses that there are two problems associated with being a knave (i.e., with failing to regulate one’s conduct by the rules of justice). The first problem is that the knave fails to attain the positive effects that come from the development of a just disposition. He cuts himself off from “inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of [his] own conduct” (EPM 9.23; SBN 283). These, Hume argues, “are circumstances, very requisite to happiness, that will be cherished and cultivated by every honest man, who feels the importance of them” (EPM 9.23; SBN 283). The second problem is that the knave fails to feel the importance of these effects. His “heart rebels not against” unjust behavior; he feels “no reluctance to the thoughts of villainy or baseness”; he fears not the “total loss of reputation” that comes with unjust behavior (EPM 9.23;

SBN 283). In short, the knave has not developed a concern for his own reputation; he has not undergone the psychological transformation of the just person.

The fully transformed, just individual, on the other hand, has a concern for her reputation. She values meaningful interactions with others, gauges her own worth in terms of these interactions, and so successfully regulates her behavior by the rules of justice. An appreciation of the development of this concern for reputation is precisely what Darwall's account lacks, and is what is needed to provide us with a full (and consistent) illustration of the psychological transformation incurred by parties who morally commit to the rules of justice. This understanding of the transformation, I have suggested, will provide us with the tools necessary to understand the psychological effects of the rules of justice and, by extension, the role Hume sees for justice.

### 3. Pride Re-Directed

The development of a concern for reputation, is, I have argued, the mark of the fully transformed just person, and is what sustains her commitment to rule-regulation. She is not, as Darwall suggests, motivated solely by the commitment to rule-regulation; rather, she develops the commitment to rule-regulation because she is concerned for her reputation. I will now argue that the development of a concern for reputation tracks the redirection of pride, which plays a more significant and fundamental role in the development of people's social natures. The rules of justice both prompt and enable this redirection of pride, showing an important role of justice to be the development of people's social natures.

There is an obvious sense in which we can understand a concern for reputation as evolving from an agent's passion for pride. In fact, Annette Baier classifies "a concern for reputation" as a version of pride itself, writing:

This self-'reverence' is a solemn version of self-esteem, or proper pride. It needs the nourishment of the esteem of those one esteems. It also needs their verdict to confirm or correct one's own self-evaluations, especially evaluations concerning how proper and properly veiled one's pride is, whether or not it is verging on conceit.<sup>25</sup>

The connection Baier draws between a concern for reputation and the properly formed, virtuous pride is an informative one, particularly in its emphasis on the need for conformity between one's self-evaluation, and the evaluations of oneself by others. This sort of conformity, what we might call psychological harmony is essential to the development of a properly grounded pride. I will now explain why pride is so dependent upon psychological harmony, before making the further case that pride becomes redirected to its proper fulfillment through the rules of justice.

### **3.1 Pride: A Socially Dependent Passion**

Hume believes that pride—considered generally now—is a socially dependent passion whose existence in an agent depends on two external sources. Its first and original cause lies in an agent's reflection on a number of different things: reputation, character, virtue, beauty, and riches. While these primary sources are important ingredients in the production of pride, Hume believes such things “have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others” (T 2.1.11.1; SBN 316). The esteem and recognition of others is thus the second source of pride. Both of these sources must be present in order for an agent to take a well-founded pride in something. If one source is absent, the emotion an agent experiences is not “pride proper.” When, for example, others do not second an agent's initial reflection of her supposed sources of pride, it runs into the danger of becoming what Hume calls “an over-weaning conceit of our own merit” (T 3.3.2.8; SBN 596) that arises when we pride ourselves in things that are not really worthy.

I will call this over-weaning conceit “misdirected pride” (contrasted with “pride proper”), for it is produced when an agent prides herself in things she should not. Misdirected pride—what Hume also refers to as an “ill-grounded conceit” (T 3.3.2.7; SBN 596)—is likely produced when two conditions hold: first, an agent initially feels pride in something that is either not related to her, or it is not a source of true worth. Second, for whatever reason, the agent fails to have this initial reflection seconded by others. This failure is important, both because in lacking the esteem of others, she lacks an essential ingredient in the production of pride proper, and because in failing to have her initial reflection seconded by others, she fails to realize the error she may have made in the initial reflection. Consequently, her initial reflection has produced a misdirected pride in the agent, an over-weaning conceit of herself that is “vicious and disagreeable” (T 3.3.2.7; SBN 596), and causes hatred amongst those considering her character.

Production of a well-grounded, virtuous pride is thus dependent upon social interactions and sympathetic engagement with others. While Hume does note that these social elements can be found in a pre-justice society (primarily in the family), there is good reason to think that establishment of the conventions of justice is conducive to the production of pride, and that, moreover, the conventions of justice make possible new grounds for pride. To show this, I first argue that in a pre-justice society, pride faces serious obstacles to its fulfillment, making it the case that pride is often misdirected in a pre-justice society.

### **3.2 Pride in a Pre-Justice Society: Misdirected**

To appreciate fully the ways in which the conventions of justice are conducive to most forms of pride, let us begin by considering the obstacles to developing



pride in a pre-justice society. In a pre-justice society, possessions are unstable, and passions are partial. The combination of these two features of the Humean state of nature strongly suggests that the pride individuals develop in a pre-justice society in most cases will be misdirected.

Before the conventions of justice exist, possessions are insecure. There is “no such thing as property” (T 3.2.2.28; SBN 501), because there are no rules that define and protect the connection between external goods and the agent who “possesses” them. And because the condition of external goods is marked by “easy change,” there are no possessions that are tied to the individual in the requisite relationship needed to produce pride.<sup>26</sup> More specifically, there are no possessions that an agent can truly claim to be hers. Such a concept of ownership is simply non-existent absent the conventions of justice. Lack of this concept is problematic for the production of pride given Hume’s claim that objects must be distinctively related to the self. Indeed, an object’s being related to the self is the mark of pride-producing objects, as opposed to other objects that simply produce a pleasant sensation: “any thing that gives a pleasant sensation, *and is related to the self*, excites the passion of pride” (T 2.1.5.8; SBN 288; my emphasis).

In his discussion of how it is that an object must be related to oneself in order for it to produce a properly grounded pride (T 2.1.6; SBN 290–4), the following features emerge as requirements. First, the object must be, in a broad sense, uniquely related to the self. While one object can be related to a number of people, who could each take pride in it, there must be something that distinguishes the object as being “mine.” Second, the relation between the object and the self must be identifiable, stable, and continuous; that is, there must be a distinct relationship that exists over time. This is a weaker requirement than the first, yet helps us to see why ownership is plausibly requisite for taking pride in material goods. Absent a concept of ownership, material goods lack a unique and identifiable relationship to the agent. The agent may have them in her momentary possession, yet because of the conditions of easy exchange, and the lack of the concept of property, it seems unlikely that, even if someone does initially feel a passion of pride in the material goods, that passion will be seconded by others, who are unable to ascertain the necessary relationship. Material possessions, before the existence of property, are thus largely eliminated as a possible original source of pride.

There are, of course, other sources of pride Hume discusses, the most important of which are general character-based traits, including virtue, reputation, wit, and so on.<sup>27</sup> While it is reasonable to think some character-based traits have the potential to produce pride in a pre-justice state, there are also reasons to be skeptical that this would often be the case. There are two reasons why these possible sources of pride are unlikely to produce pride in pre-justice society. First, we have reason to think character-based traits in general would not be held in very high regard in a pre-justice society where the most important thing is acquiring

material possessions. While, as I have argued, material possessions would rarely produce pride in pre-justice society, people's main focus nonetheless would be on securing such possessions. Nature cruelly has given us "numberless wants and necessities," yet "slender means" to attain what we want and need (T 3.2.2.2; SBN 484). We would be driven by the desire of "acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friend," a desire which "is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society" (T 3.2.2.12; SBN 491). As long as we are in pre-justice society, Hume argues, we will never be able to satisfy our material wants and needs; but we will try. Acquiring material possessions would be the main concern, not virtue, reputation, and wit.

A second reason to be skeptical of the power of character traits (and, for that matter, material possessions as well) to produce pride in a pre-justice community concerns the natural and partial tendencies of our passions, a partiality that, as we have already seen, prevents us from interacting with people on the harmonious level necessary to attain the esteem requisite to produce pride.

We attain the esteem of others when others second our initial reflection of our worth. This "seconding," and the esteem it constitutes, is produced when one individual sympathizes with another, feels approval from the other, and comes to feel the same sort of pleasure as the one she observes. However, as the following passage makes clear, such esteem never results when a person's pride is misdirected (unless we share the same erroneous opinion):

When a man, whom we are really persuaded to be of inferior merit, is presented to us; if we observe in him any extraordinary degree of pride and self-conceit; the firm persuasion he has of his own merit, takes hold of the imagination, and diminishes us in our own eyes, in the same manner, as if he were really possess'd of all the good qualities which he so liberally attributes to himself. Our idea is here precisely in that medium, which is requisite to make it operate on us by comparison. *Were it accompanied with belief, and did the person appear to have the same merit, which he assumes to himself, it wou'd have a contrary to what happens where the person's merit seems below his pretensions.* (T 3.3.2.6; SBN 595; my emphasis)

Hume's point, it seems clear, is that we will only esteem those agents whose feelings of pride are proportionate to our belief in their actual causes of pride. If an agent feels a tremendous amount of pride for a trait that is only slightly praiseworthy, then, rather than esteem the agent, we fault her as having a misdirected pride and an overweening conceit of herself. However, when an agent's pride is well-founded, the pleasure she takes in her possessions is transferred to another person, who comes to approve of the agent, and esteem her. This is why pride proper is a virtue, as "nothing can be more laudable, than to have a value for ourselves, where

we really have qualities that are valuable” (T 3.3.2.7; SBN 596). However, when an agent feels pride in herself when she does not have qualities that are valuable, something else happens. The pleasure she takes in herself generates more pain than pleasure in others, who find her over-weening conceit to be “vicious and disagreeable” (T 3.3.2.8; SBN 596). In the case of misdirected pride, the psychological process of comparison, rather than sympathy, enters into the picture and reverses the transferred feelings. Comparison generates “contrary sensations . . . in the beholder, from those which are felt by the person, whom he considers” (T 2.2.8.9; SBN 375), namely, humility, which is painful.

It is clear that misdirected pride, in virtue of being ill-grounded, generates comparison in others and so rarely produces esteem in those considering the afflicted agent. As I will now argue, there is good reason to think that, in pre-justice society, an agent’s initial reflection on her worth would most often generate comparison, even when her feelings of pride were well-grounded, and so would rarely produce pride proper that depends on the esteem of others.

Hume argues that the substantive difference between the operations of sympathy and comparison lies in the extent to which the observer’s conception of herself enters into the transference of feelings as a point of comparison:

In all kinds of comparison an object makes us always receive from another, to which it is compar’d a sensation contrary to what arises from itself in its direct and immediate survey. The direct survey of another’s pleasure naturally gives us pleasure; and therefore produced pain, when compare’d with our own. His pain, considered in itself is painful; but augments the idea of our own happiness, and gives us pleasure. (T 3.3.2.4; SBN 593)

Comparison, it seems, comes into play whenever the observer’s conception of herself is at the front of her mind. For example, when an agent who thinks very frequently about her material status sees others taking pride in their material status, she naturally will come to feel negatively towards them, because she cannot help but compare their status to her own. These negative feelings likely lead to the emotions of envy and malice that arise from comparing one’s situation with the other’s situation.<sup>28</sup>

Recall now the third feature of the Humean pre-justice society: people have limited benevolence and corresponding selfishness. People’s passions are inherently partial—the individual cares about herself and those closest to her; she does not care about those outside of her circle of family and friends. As common experience, as well as Hume, tell us, where passions are partial, and we view situations from our partial point of view rather than from a general point of view, comparison comes into play. Since, in a pre-justice society, all of our passions are partial, any pleasure obtained by others with whom we do not naturally identify will more than likely

generate pain by comparison in the observer and rarely the esteem requisite to produce pride.

While pride may be possible in a pre-justice society, it is nonetheless unlikely to be produced (in its proper, well-grounded form) in a pre-justice society. Possession-specific pride, the most common and obvious source of pride, would rarely be properly grounded in a pre-justice society where material possessions are insecure. Moreover, people's desires for material possessions would both overshadow and interfere with the development of many of the remaining possible sources of pride that are based largely in character traits. The obvious sources of pride are thus severely diminished in a state of nature, making it hard for one to secure any well-grounded initial reflection of her worth. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that, in a pre-justice community, people's passions would be partial, and so the pleasure one finds in her own worth would generate a displeasure in others, rather than generating their esteem, which is a secondary, yet essential component of pride. The material and psychological effects of the conventions of justice, however, help to resolve many of these obstacles. In so doing, the conventions of justice not only enable the full production of the most common sources of pride—material possessions; they also create conditions for new forms of pride to be produced, and so for pride to take on a new direction. The result is the development of a new convention-dependent redirection of pride, a pride that extends beyond one's material possessions to one's virtue and character. This redirected pride is marked by a concern for reputation and has the development of a just disposition as its object.

### **3.3 *Pride and Justice***

The primary tangible effect of the conventions of justice is the stabilization of property. As we have seen, this material effect prompts a psychological transformation in people who commit to the rules of justice. The first stage of this psychological transformation is the development of a general point of view that enables people to extend their sympathies beyond their narrow circle, and to seek and maintain the psychological harmony with others. The combination of these two effects, stability of material possessions and development of a general point of view, provides a climate conducive to the production of pride in its most common forms. It does this in two ways.

First, because property exists, and material possessions are stable, people now stand in the relationship to their material possessions that is necessary for them to be a source of pride. Second, because people have shifted from their partial perspectives to general ones, comparison will not impede their judgments of others as frequently. When another feels pride in her genuinely worthy accomplishments, others will second her opinion and esteem her. Comparison may rear its head occasionally; however, in this post-conventional society, it will not be the norm and stands rather

as the non-dominant partner to sympathy. In these ways, the conventions of justice enable the production of pride in its most common forms, namely, pride in one's material possessions.

Let us now consider how it is that the conventions of justice make possible new forms of pride. We have seen that the development of the general point of view marks only the first stage of the psychological transformation undergone by parties who commit to justice. The full psychological transformation involves also a commitment to regulating one's behavior by the rules of justice, and the development of a concern for one's reputation. People so transformed by the conventions of justice thus commit to establishing meaningful social relationships with others and begin to define themselves in terms of their success in maintaining these relationships. Because they hold their interactions with others to be of fundamental importance, they develop a new form of pride that has as its object their commitment to the virtue of justice.

This redirection of pride, prompted and enabled by the conventions of justice, tracks the development of a concern for reputation, and, perhaps most importantly, secures the advancement of people's social natures. We have seen that people are social beings who depend on others for the development of their passions. When pride has as its object the person's commitment to the rules of justice, we can see this commitment both as a person's affirmation of her social nature, and as a commitment to nourishing it through engaging in the meaningful social interactions essential to it, that are made possible by the rules of justice. With the institution of the rules of justice, people check their partiality and become aware of their dependence on others and the impact other's opinions have upon their own psychology. This awareness allows them to see their relationships with others in a new light: they work with each other on a level of trust and respect. They start to depend on one another, to keep their promises, to remain faithful. As they begin to internally regulate themselves by the rules of justice, it becomes important to each person who does so that she remains on this level with others, and so she develops a concern for her character. In operating on this level, and treating the rules of justice as inviolable, such persons develop a good reputation and so become proud of their character—a feeling that is reverberated by others around them.

The just person thus develops an "antipathy to treachery and roguery [that] is too strong to be counterbalanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage" (EPM 9.23; SBN 283). She no longer acts according to the external rewards of individual just acts, and instead develops the internally motivated disposition to follow the rules of justice invariably; a disposition prompted by a concern for her character and reputation. She is the person who keeps her promises, regardless of the inconveniences of doing so. She is the person who repays secret loans, even to the miser. In being a just person, she redirects and satisfies her pride: "Inward

peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our own conduct; these are the circumstances, very requisite to happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by every honest man, who feels the importance of them" (EPM 9.23; SBN 283). Others second this pride, as acting faithfully on the rules of justice also ensures that others will esteem us:

There is nothing, which touches us more nearly than our reputation, and nothing on which our reputation depends more than our conduct, with relation to the property of others. For this reason, every one, who has any regard to his character, or who intends to live on good terms with mankind, must fix an inviolable law to himself, never, by any temptation, to be induced to violate those principles, which are essential to a man of probity and honor. (T 3.2.2.27; SBN 501)

It is clear that the just person takes pride in her character; I hope to have shown that it is also the case that *only* the just person can take a well-grounded pride in her character. This is so because, in order to take a well-grounded pride in one's character, one must undergo the psychological transformation distinctive of the just person, a process made possible only by the establishment of the conventions of justice.

Pride is thus intricately linked to justice. The conventions of justice make it more likely that pride in its most common forms will be developed and properly grounded. The conventions of justice also make possible new forms of pride; namely, the pride in one's character that is distinctive of, and possible only for, the just person.<sup>29</sup>

## Conclusion

I have argued that a full understanding of how people become psychologically transformed through morally committing to the rules of justice shows an important and underappreciated role of justice. This is to enable people to satisfy their passions of pride and redirect it towards virtue and character. The conventions of justice, I have argued, provide the only context under which this transformation of pride can happen. This shows that the rules of justice play not only an expedient role in stabilizing property, but also a more fundamental role in helping people to develop psychologically.

Understanding this role helps us to make sense of the complexities of Hume's account of justice. The rules of justice *must* be inflexible, because it is only through exceptionless adherence to the rules of justice that the agent will develop a rule-following disposition, and come to take pride in her character for so doing. The sensible knave *indeed* lacks the inward peace of mind that comes along with

developing a rule-following disposition, for he simply has not undergone the requisite psychological transformation necessary to fully commit, and appreciate the rules of justice. It is within these complexities that the richness of Hume's theory of justice comes through to its fullest extent: justice, for Hume, is essential not only for its expediency, but moreover for its role in helping agents to develop psychologically and cultivate their pride.

## NOTES

Versions of this material have been presented to audiences at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meetings (March 2004) and the Southeastern Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy (October 2002). I'd like to thank members of these audiences for their feedback, as well as Stephen Darwall, Don Garrett, Gerald Postema, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Jacqueline Taylor, and several anonymous referees for their extensive written feedback on earlier drafts of this paper.

1 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), abbreviated as "T" and cited by Book, part, section and paragraph, followed by the page number in the "SBN" edition, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).

2 David Hume, *Enquiry into the Principles of Morals: A Critical Edition*, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), hereafter abbreviated "EPM" and cited by section and paragraph number, followed by page numbers in the "SBN" edition, *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and the Principles of Morals*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

3 The circle argument occurs at T 3.2.1 (SBN 477–84).

4 For example, Gerald Postema argues that Hume employs a Hobbesian strategy, although works with a more social conception of human nature. Postema, "Hume's Reply to the Sensible Knave," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 5.1 (1988): 23–40, 25.

5 Terence Penelhum, *Hume* (Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1992), 158.

6 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "Why Hume's 'General Point of View' Isn't Ideal—And Shouldn't Be," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 11.1 (1994): 202–28, 225.

7 Hume discusses the sensible knave in EPM 9.22–5 (SBN 282–83).

8 Francis Snare, *Morals, Motivation, and Convention: Hume's Influential Doctrines* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 177.

9 For example, Jason Baldwin argues that Hume sees sensible knaves as simply "freaks whose actions don't make sense for the rest of us." Baldwin, "Hume's Knave and the Interests of Justice" *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 42.3 (2004): 277–96, 296.

10 This term refers to the stages of psychological development Hume suggests most of us undergo, and reflects the process through which Hume thinks our natures can be developed and extended. However, as Annette Baier notes, we should not take the connotations of the word “transformation” too literally, for Hume resists the idea that our natures can ever be *changed* to the degree sometimes suggested by the term “transformation.” Baier stresses that although Hume presents a “remarkable story of social and psychological transformation,” Hume “himself insists that men can never change their natures, so he would not call it a psychological transformation, merely a change of situation which allows unchanged passions to be exhibited in new ways.” Baier, “Master Passions,” in *Explaining Emotions*, ed. A. O. Rorty (Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1980): 403–23, 413.

11 Hume writes: “’Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects . . . . By society all his infirmities are compensated” (T 3.2.2.3; SBN 485).

12 Sayre-McCord, “Why Hume’s ‘General Point of View’ Isn’t Ideal,” 228; italics in original.

13 Jacqueline Taylor, “Justice and the Foundations of Social Morality in Hume’s *Treatise*,” *Hume Studies* 24.1 (1998): 5–30, 5.

14 Taylor, “Justice and the Foundations of Social Morality,” 19.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 20.

17 Taylor seems to admit as much in her discussion of the limitations of Hume’s view of justice. Taylor, “Justice and the Foundations of Social Morality,” 20–4.

18 Stephen Darwall, *The British Moralists and the Internal Ought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 312.

19 Darwall, *British Moralists*, 313.

20 Indeed, this is Darwall’s stated purpose: “If we take the virtue of justice to consist in the agent’s regulating herself by the relevant rules (or her disposition to do so), we can solve various puzzles of Hume’s text” (Darwall, 313).

21 Darwall, *British Moralists*, 288.

22 Ibid., 312.

23 “Whatever other passions we may be actuated by; pride, ambition, curiosity, revenge or lust; the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor would they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others” (T 2.2.5.15; SBN 362).

24 Although this particular quote comes up in the course of Hume’s discussion of the moral obligation to promise-keeping, Hume makes the same point with respect to justice at T 3.2.2 (SBN 484–501).

25 Annette Baier, *A Progress of Sentiments* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 210.

26 See Hume’s discussion of pride in Book 2, especially T 2.1.5 (SBN 285–9).



27 “Vice and virtue . . . are the most obvious causes” of pride and humility (T 2.1.7.2; SBN 295). There are other sources of pride, such as beauty and strength, as well as country and birthplace. In a pre-justice community these may be possible sources of pride; although I do think that comparison frequently will prevent these initial passions of pride from being seconded (see my discussion of comparison later in this section). For now, I focus on the primary causes of pride—material goods and character traits—both of which I think are unlikely to produce pride proper in a pre-justice community.

28 Of course these feelings can arise in society as well; my claim is that they are more likely to arise in a pre-justice community.

29 As the conventions of justice regulating property are the first in a series of conventions, it is natural to think that with each new convention, new grounds for pride will arise, thus enabling people to continue their psychological development. This implication is similar to one Annette Baier explores in “Master Passions,” where she describes Hume’s *Treatise* account of the artificial virtues as, among other things, “an account of a transformation of the causes of pride, from present goods to absent property and abstract wealth and political power, from the ability to make and get goods to the reputation for honesty and fidelity, obedience to law and magisterial impartiality” (Baier, 414).